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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-2507 
___________ 
 
FENGYING YANG, 
                     Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 
                      Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A093-396-912) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Susan G. Roy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 25, 2012 
 
Before:  AMBRO, ALDISERT and NYGAARD, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed: April 26, 2012 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Fengying Yang petitions for review of a final order of removal.  For the reasons 
discussed below, we will dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.  
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I. 
 Yang, a citizen of China, was served with a Notice to Appear charging her as 
removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) and alleging that she had entered the United 
States without a valid entry document.  She conceded removability and applied for 
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture 
(“CAT”), claiming that she feared persecution upon her return to China as a result of her 
activities with the China Democracy Party (“CDP”).   
 Yang testified before an immigration judge (“IJ”) in support of her applications.  
The IJ first found that Yang was unable to meet her burden of proving her identity with 
adequate, reliable evidence—she used another’s passport to gain entry to the United 
States, had unexplained difficulty providing accurate biographical testimony, and 
submitted an unauthenticated birth certificate.  The IJ identified numerous other problems 
with Yang’s testimony, including her refusal to answer questions about why she left 
China when asked by her attorney1
                                              
1 In her application and amended application, Yang detailed two incidents prompting her 
to leave China—her sister’s death as a result of exposure to poisons at the pharmaceutical 
company where she worked, and mistreatment as a result of rejecting local officials’ 
attempts at extortion.  See AR 665-6671; 501-508.   
 and her inability to recall her address or the name of 
the town in which she claimed to live for three years after her arrival in the United States.  
Additionally, although she testified that her fear of future persecution arose from Chinese 
officials having visited her parents and husband due to political activities in the United 
States, she omitted any mention of that visit from her application for asylum.  In light of 
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these and many other inconsistencies in her testimony, the IJ found that Yang was not 
credible and denied relief on that basis.   
 Yang appealed to the BIA, arguing that the IJ’s adverse credibility determination 
and other holdings were erroneous.  The Board dismissed Yang’s appeal in June 2009. 
Yang moved the Board to reissue its decision in light of her prior counsel’s 
ineffectiveness, and the BIA granted her motion.  Accordingly, Yang’s petition for 
review, filed within thirty days of the reissued opinion, is timely.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).  
She raises three claims: 1) she provided sufficient evidence to prove her identity; 2) the 
adverse credibility finding was not supported by substantial evidence; and 3) she did not 
waive an appeal of the denial of withholding of removal under the CAT as that issue was 
raised before the BIA. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1).  See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 2001).  Prior to raising 
an issue for judicial review, a petitioner must exhaust all administrative remedies 
available as of right regarding that issue. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1);  Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 
562 F.3d 246, 250 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009).  This is a jurisdictional requirement.  See Hoxha v. 
Holder
 This Court reviews the decision of the Board and, to the extent deferred to or 
incorporated therein, the decision of the immigration judge.  
, 559 F.3d 157, 159 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009).   
Miah v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 
434, 439 (3d Cir. 2003).  We review factual findings, including any credibility 
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determinations, under a substantial evidence standard.  See Cao v. Att’y Gen., 407 F.3d 
146, 152 (3d Cir. 2005).  Under that standard, we must uphold the BIA’s decision unless 
the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.  See Abdille v. 
Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2001).  The burden of establishing eligibility for 
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT is on the applicant.  Toure v. 
Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a)). 2
III. 
 
A. 
 As an initial matter, we must address the Government’s arguments regarding the 
extent of our jurisdiction over Yang’s claims.  First, the government argues that Yang did 
not exhaust her claim that the BIA erred in holding that she waived her arguments 
regarding relief under the CAT.   See
 The Government bases its argument on the very things Yang now attacks: the 
BIA’s determination that she did not appeal the denial of relief under the CAT and its 
 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).  We disagree.   
                                              
2 Because Yang filed her asylum application after the enactment of the REAL ID Act, the 
inconsistencies, inaccuracies, or falsehoods upon which the adverse credibility finding is 
based need not go to the heart of her claim. See Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 119 n.5 
(3d Cir. 2008).  Rather, the REAL ID Act permits credibility determinations to be based 
on observations of Yang’s demeanor, the plausibility of her story, and the consistency of 
her statements. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Gabuniya v. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 316, 
322 n.7 (3d Cir. 2006).  We have not applied the REAL ID Act standard in a precedential 
opinion.  Here, because the inconsistencies identified by the IJ relate to the heart of 
Yang’s claims for relief, and would thus support an adverse credibility determination 
even under the pre-REAL ID Act standard, we need not consider whether 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) is consistent with due process. See Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531, 
538 (5th Cir. 2009) (canvassing Circuit law on the provision). 
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concomitant holding that the issue was waived.  In her brief on appeal to the BIA, Yang 
argued:  
The IJ erred in her finding that “there is nothing in the evidence to show 
that [Appellant] would be tortured or that government officials would 
acquiesce or turn a blind eye to her torture should she return.  Mere 
imprisonment, although certainly unfortunate and not condoned by this 
Court, does not rise to the level of the stringent torture standard set out in 
the regulations . . .” 
Appeal Brief at 13 (quoting the Oral Decision of the Immigration Judge at 26) (emphasis 
and alteration in original).  She went on to argue that that finding was not supported by 
substantial evidence, that the IJ failed to consider the State Department’s report in her 
plausibility analysis, and that the IJ made no specific finding as to whether other evidence 
in the record supported Yang’s claim.  Although Yang incorrectly identified the issue as 
pertaining to her asylum claim, she explicitly attacked the finding that she would not be 
tortured upon her return to China; this was unambiguously relevant to the denial of her 
request for relief under the CAT.  In fact, the quotation provided in Yang’s brief 
continued, “. . . and therefore I will deny her claim for withholding of removal under the 
Convention Against Torture as well.”  Oral Decision of the Immigration Judge at 26 
(emphasis added).  Yang’s argument on appeal was more than sufficient to place the BIA 
on notice that she intended to appeal the denial of relief under the CAT.  Dan Hua Wu v. 
Att’y Gen., 571 F.3d 314, 317 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[s]o long as a[] . . . petitioner makes some 
effort, however insignificant, to place the [BIA] on notice of a straightforward issue 
being raised on appeal, a petitioner is deemed to have exhausted her administrative 
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remedies.”) (quoting Lin v. Att’y Gen.
 The Government next argues that we lack jurisdiction over four of the specific 
challenges Yang now raises, to wit: 1) her challenge to the findings that her testimony 
was “laborious” and that she was unresponsive at times; 2) her argument that the negative 
inferences drawn from Yang’s refusal to testify regarding her experiences prior to leaving 
China violated due process; 3) her allegation of a “fatal error” in the translation of the 
letter from Yang’s father; and 4) her challenge to the finding of omissions in her Form I-
589 asylum application despite her inability to explain those omissions because of 
translation problems.  On appeal to the BIA, Yang raised arguments regarding the IJ’s 
adverse credibility determination based upon her nervousness and various translation 
errors.  Accordingly, we hold that her argument regarding the finding that her testimony 
was “laborious” and unresponsive is exhausted.  
, 543 F.3d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 2008)).  Accordingly, 
we hold that Yang has adequately exhausted the CAT claim she presents in her petition. 
Wu, 571 F.3d at 317.  However her due 
process argument, her argument regarding the translation of her father’s letter, and her 
arguments regarding omissions in her asylum application were never raised before the 
Board. We will therefore dismiss them for lack of jurisdiction. Hoxha
B. 
, 559 F.3d 159 n.3. 
 We now turn to the merits of Yang’s claims.  After review of the record, we 
conclude that substantial evidence supports the finding that Yang did not testify credibly.  
Yang testified that she did not fear returning to China until she was informed that 
Chinese police visited her mother and specifically inquired as to her anti-government 
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activities in the United States.  This incident was not, however, mentioned in her written 
application for relief.  Yang explained that, although she was apparently unafraid to 
continue protesting, she was “afraid that the Chinese policemen would come to America 
to take me away” if she mentioned the incident in her application.  AR 383.  She also 
claimed that she didn’t feel it was necessary to mention the incident in her application.  
AR 389-90.  The IJ and BIA rejected those explanations, and Yang has not demonstrated 
that the record compels a contrary result.  Her argument that there were interpretation 
problems—that she “may have offered the testimony in response to questions that were 
not correctly interpreted”—is unpersuasive.3   The omission of what she claims formed 
the basis of her fear of persecution from her asylum application is undoubtedly material 
to her claims and is more than sufficient to support the BIA’s adverse credibility finding.  
In light of that finding, we agree that she failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability 
that she will be persecuted upon return to China.  We likewise discern no error in the 
Board’s concomitant holding that Yang did not meet her burden to demonstrate that she 
was entitled to relief.  See Chukwu v. Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 188-89 (3d Cir. 2007); 
Toure
                                              
3 We note that in her filings before the BIA and in support of her petition for review, 
Yang has offered nothing by way of an alternate explanation, i.e., what question she may 
have thought she was answering when she informed the IJ that she was afraid Chinese 
police would come to America to take her away. 
, 443 F.3d 310, 317.  As she was not entitled to relief, her remaining arguments 
regarding asylum and withholding of removal need not be addressed.     
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 For the reasons outlined above, we hold that the BIA erred in holding that Yang 
waived her arguments regarding relief under the CAT.  Remand, however, “is not 
required when it would be an idle and useless formality.”  Li Hua Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 
642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Here, 
Yang’s application for CAT relief was based upon the same testimony as her claims for 
asylum and withholding of removal; the adverse credibility finding was therefore 
likewise fatal to her CAT claim, and her appeal would have been dismissed regardless.  
See Yu v. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 346, 349 (3d Cir. 2008).  Accordingly, the BIA’s error 
was harmless, and we need not remand the matter for further consideration.  Yuan
IV. 
, 642 
F.3d at 427 (“[W]e will view an error as harmless and not necessitating a remand to the 
BIA when it is highly probable that the error did not affect the outcome of the case.”).   
 For the reasons we have given, we dismiss in part and deny the petition for 
review.@ 
 
